By
Randy Nichols (LANAKI) President of the American
Cryptogram Association from 1994-1996. Executive Vice
President from 1992-1994
CLASSICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY COURSE
BY LANAKI
December 05, 1995
LECTURE 4
SUBSTITUTION WITH VARIANTS
Part III
MULTILITERAL SUBSTITUTION
SUMMARY
Welcome back from the Thanksgiving holiday break. The
good news is that this lecture will come to you about
Christmas, therefore, no homework. The not so good news is that
this concluding Lecture 4 on Substitution with Variants covers
some difficult material of wide practically in the field.
In Lecture 4, we complete our look into English
monoalphabetic substitution ciphers, by describing multiliteral
substitution with difficult variants. The Homophonic and
GrandPre Ciphers will be covered. The use of isologs is
demonstrated. A synoptic diagram of the substitution ciphers
described in Lectures 1-4 will be presented.
MULTILITERAL SUBSTITUTION WITH
MULTIPLE-EQUIVALENT CIPHER ALPHABETS - aka
"MONOALPHABETIC SUBSTITUTION WITH VARIANTS"
Each English letter in plain text has a characteristic
frequency which affords definite clues in the solution of
simple monoalphabetic ciphers. Associations which individual
letters form in combining to make up words, and the
peculiarities which certain of them manifest in plain text,
afford further direct clues by means of which ordinary
monoalphabetic substitution encipherments of such plain text
may be readily solved. [FR1]
Cryptographers have devised methods for disguising,
suppressing, or eliminating the foregoing characteristics in
the cryptograms produced by methods described in Lectures 1-3.
One category of methods called "variants or variant
values" is that in which the letters of the plain
component of a cipher alphabet are assigned two or more cipher
equivalents.
Systems involving variants are generally multiliteral. In such
systems, there are a large number of equivalents made available
by combinations and permutations of a limited number of
elements, each letter of the plain text may be represented by
several multiliteral cipher equivalents which may be selected
at random. For example, if 3-letter combinations are employed
as multiliteral equivalents, there are 263 or 17,576
available equivalents for the 26 letters of the plain text.
They may be assigned in equal numbers of different
equivalents for the 26 letters, in which case each letter would
be representable by 676 different 3 letter equivalents or they
be assigned on some other basis, for example proportionately to
the relative frequencies of the plain text letters. [FR1]
The primary object of substitution with variants is again
to provide several values which may be employed at random in a
simple substitution of cipher equivalents for the plain text
letters.
As a slight diversion, the reader may ask about
uniliteral substitution with variants. It is but not very
practical. Note the following cipher alphabet constructed in
French by Captain Roger Baudouin in reference [BAUD]:
Plain
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a
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b
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c
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d
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e
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f
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g
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h
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i
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l
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m
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n
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o
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p
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q
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r
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s
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t
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u
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v
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x
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z
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Cipher
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L
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G
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O
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R
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F
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Q
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A
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H
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C
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M
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B
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T
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I
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D
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N
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P
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U
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S
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Y
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E
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W
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J
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K
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X
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Z
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V
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(Note that the Captain was not an ACA member. The H=H
combination is not allowed.)
Baudouin proposed that the J and Y plain be replaced by I
plain and K plain by C plain or Q plain and W plain by VV
plain. Four cipher letters would be available as variants for
the high- frequency plain text letters in French.
Mixed alphabets formed by including all repeated letters
of the key word or key phrase in the cipher component were
common in Edgar Allen Poe's day but are impractical because
they are ambiguous, making decipherment difficult; for example:
Enciphering Alphabet:
Plain
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a
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b
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c
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d
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e
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f
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g
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h
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i
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j
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k
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l
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m
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n
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o
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p
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q
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r
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s
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t
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u
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v
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w
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x
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y
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z
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Cipher
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N
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O
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W
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I
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S
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T
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H
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E
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T
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I
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M
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E
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F
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O
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R
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A
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L
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L
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G
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O
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O
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D
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M
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E
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N
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T
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Inverse form for deciphering:
Cipher
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A
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B
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C
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D
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E
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F
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G
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H
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I
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J
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K
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L
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M
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N
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O
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P
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Q
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R
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S
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T
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U
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V
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W
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X
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Y
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Z
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Plain
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p
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v
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h
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m
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s
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g
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d
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|
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q
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k
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a
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b
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o
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e
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f
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c
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l
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j
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r
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w
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y
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n
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i
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x
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t
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z
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u
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The average cipher clerk would have difficulty in
decrypting a cipher group such as TOOET, each letter having 3
or more equivalents, from which plain text fragments (n)inth,
ft thi(s), it thi, etc. can be formed on decipherment. [FR1]
THEORETICAL DISTINCTIONS
In simple or single-equivalent monoalphabetic substitution with
variants, two points are evident:
1) the same letter of the plain text is invariably represented
by but one and always the same character or cipher unit of the
cryptogram.
2) The same character or cipher unit of the cryptogram
invariably represents one and always the same letter of the
plain text.
In multiliteral - equivalent monoalphabetic substitution with
variants, two points are also evident:
1) the same letter of the plain text may be represented by one
or more different characters or cipher units of the cryptogram.
But,
2) The same character or cipher unit of the cryptogram
nevertheless invariably represents one and always the same
letter of the plain text.
SIMPLE TYPES OF CIPHER ALPHABETS
WITH VARIANTS
Figure 4-1
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6
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7
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8
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9
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0
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1
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2
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3
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4
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5
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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6
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1
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*
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A
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B
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C
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D
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E
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7
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2
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*
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F
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G
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H
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IJ
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K
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8
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3
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*
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L
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M
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N
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O
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P
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9
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4
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*
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Q
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R
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S
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T
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U
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0
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5
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*
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V
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W
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X
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Y
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Z
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Figure 4-2
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V
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W
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X
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Y
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Z
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Q
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R
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S
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T
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U
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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L
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F
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A
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*
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A
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B
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C
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D
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E
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M
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G
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B
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*
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F
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G
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H
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IJ
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K
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N
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H
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C
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*
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L
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M
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N
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O
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P
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O
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I
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D
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*
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Q
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R
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S
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T
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U
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P
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K
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E
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*
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V
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W
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X
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Y
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Z
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Figure 4-3
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A
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E
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I
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O
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U
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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T
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N
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H
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B
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*
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A
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B
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C
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D
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E
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V
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P
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J
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C
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*
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F
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G
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H
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IJ
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K
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W
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Q
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K
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D
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*
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L
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M
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N
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O
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P
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X
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R
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L
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F
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*
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Q
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R
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S
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T
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U
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Z
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S
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M
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G
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*
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V
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W
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X
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Y
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Z
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Figure 4-4
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V
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W
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X
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Y
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Z
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Q
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R
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S
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T
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U
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L
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M
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N
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O
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P
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F
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G
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H
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I
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K
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A
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B
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C
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D
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E
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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V
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Q
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L
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F
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A
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*
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A
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B
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C
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D
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E
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W
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R
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M
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G
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B
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*
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F
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G
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H
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IJ
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K
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X
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N
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S
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H
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C
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*
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L
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M
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N
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O
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P
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Y
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T
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O
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I
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D
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*
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Q
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R
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S
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T
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U
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Z
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U
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P
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K
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E
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*
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V
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W
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X
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Y
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Z
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Figure 4-5
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O
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M
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N
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J
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K
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L
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F
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G
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H
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I
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A
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B
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C
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D
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E
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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O
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M
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J
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F
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A
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*
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E
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N
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A
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L
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U
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N
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K
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G
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B
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*
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T
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R
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S
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F
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W
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L
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H
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C
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*
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O
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IJ
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H
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Y
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X
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I
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D
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*
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D
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C
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M
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V
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K
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E
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*
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P
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G
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B
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Q
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Z
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Figure 4-6
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Z
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W
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X
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Y
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S
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U
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V
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N
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O
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P
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Q
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R
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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M
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J
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F
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A
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*
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E
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N
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A
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L
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U
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K
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G
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B
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*
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T
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R
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S
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F
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W
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L
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H
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C
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*
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O
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IJ
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H
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Y
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X
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I
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D
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*
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D
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C
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M
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V
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K
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E
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*
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P
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G
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B
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Q
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Z
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Figure 4-7
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1
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2
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3
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4
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5
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6
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7
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8
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9
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0
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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7
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4
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1
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*
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A
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B
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C
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D
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E
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F
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G
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H
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I
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J
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8
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5
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2
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*
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K
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L
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M
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N
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O
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P
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Q
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R
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S
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T
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9
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6
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3
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*
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U
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V
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W
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X
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Y
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Z
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.
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,
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:
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;
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Figure 4-8
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1
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2
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3
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4
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5
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6
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7
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8
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9
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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7
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4
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1
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*
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A
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B
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C
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D
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E
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F
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G
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H
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I
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8
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5
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2
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*
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J
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K
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L
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M
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N
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O
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P
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Q
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R
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9
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6
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3
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*
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S
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T
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U
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V
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W
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X
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Y
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Z
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*
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Figure 4-9
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1
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2
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3
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4
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5
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6
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7
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8
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9
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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5
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1
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*
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A
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B
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C
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D
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E
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F
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G
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H
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I
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6
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2
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*
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J
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K
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L
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M
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N
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O
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P
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Q
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R
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7
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3
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*
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S
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T
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U
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V
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W
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X
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Y
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1
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8
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4
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*
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2
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3
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4
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5
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6
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7
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8
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9
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0
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Figure 4-10
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1
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2
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3
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4
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5
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6
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7
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8
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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0
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8
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5
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1
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*
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T
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E
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R
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M
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I
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N
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A
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L
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S
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9
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6
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2
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*
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B
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C
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D
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F
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G
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H
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K
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J
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K
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7
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3
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*
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P
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Q
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U
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V
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W
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X
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Y
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Z
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1
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4
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*
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2
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3
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4
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5
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6
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7
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8
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9
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0
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The matrices in Figures 4 -1 to 4-10 represent some of
the simpler means for accomplishing monoalphabetic substitution
with variants. The matrices are extensions of the basic ideas
of multiliteral substitution presented in Lecture 3.
The variant equivalents for any plain text letter may be
chosen at will; thus, in Figure 4-1, e= 10, 15, 60, or 65; in
Figure 4-2, e= AU, AZ, FU, FZ, LU or LZ.
Encipherment by means of matrices shown in Figures 4-2,
4-3, 4-6 is commutative. The coordinates may be read row by
column or visa versa. There is no cryptographic ambiguity. The
remaining matrices are noncommutative. The general convention
is to read row by column.
In Figures 4-5 and 4-6, the letters in the square have
been inscribed in such a manner that, coupled with the
particular arrangement of the row and column coordinates, the
number of variants available for each plain text letter is
roughly proportional to the frequencies of the letters in the
plain text. Figure 35 incorporates a keyword on top of this
idea. [FR1]
HOMOPHONIC
The Homophonic Cipher is a simple variant system. It is a
4-level (alphabets) dinome cipher. Consider Figure 4-11.
Figure 4-11
A
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B
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C
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D
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E
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F
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G
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H
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IJ
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K
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L
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M
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N
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08
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09
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10
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11
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12
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13
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14
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15
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16
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17
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18
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19
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20
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35
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36
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37
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38
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39
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40
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41
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42
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43
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44
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45
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46
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47
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68
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69
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70
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71
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72
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73
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74
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75
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51
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52
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53
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54
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55
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87
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88
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89
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90
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91
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92
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93
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94
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95
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96
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97
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98
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99
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O
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P
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Q
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R
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S
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T
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U
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V
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W
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X
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Y
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Z
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21
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22
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23
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24
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25
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01
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02
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03
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04
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05
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06
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07
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48
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49
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50
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26
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27
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28
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29
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30
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31
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32
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33
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34
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56
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57
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58
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59
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60
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61
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62
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63
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64
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65
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66
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67
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00
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76
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77
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78
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79
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80
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81
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82
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83
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84
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85
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86
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The keyword TRIP is found by inspecting dinomes 01, 26,
51, and 76. (The lowest number in each of the four sequences.)
[FR1] [FR5]
The Russians added an interesting gimmick called the Disruption
Area. Consider Figure 4-12 and note the slashes under U - X for
the fourth level of dinomes. The famous VIC cipher used this
feature very effectively. [NIC4] Figure 4-12
A
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B
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C
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D
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E
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F
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G
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H
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I
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J
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K
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L
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M
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14
|
15
|
16
|
17
|
18
|
19
|
20
|
21
|
22
|
23
|
24
|
25
|
26
|
27
|
28
|
29
|
30
|
31
|
32
|
33
|
34
|
35
|
36
|
37
|
38
|
39
|
58
|
59
|
60
|
61
|
62
|
63
|
64
|
65
|
66
|
67
|
68
|
69
|
70
|
81
|
82
|
83
|
84
|
85
|
86
|
87
|
88
|
89
|
90
|
91
|
92
|
93
|
|
N
|
O
|
P
|
Q
|
R
|
S
|
T
|
U
|
V
|
W
|
X
|
Y
|
Z
|
01
|
02
|
03
|
04
|
05
|
06
|
07
|
08
|
09
|
10
|
11
|
12
|
13
|
40
|
41
|
42
|
43
|
44
|
45
|
46
|
47
|
48
|
49
|
50
|
51
|
52
|
71
|
72
|
73
|
74
|
75
|
76
|
77
|
78
|
53
|
54
|
55
|
56
|
57
|
94
|
95
|
96
|
97
|
98
|
99
|
00
|
//
|
//
|
//
|
//
|
79
|
80
|
The keyword NAVY is represented by dinomes 01, 27, 53,
and 79.
Security for Homophonic systems is greatly improved if
the dinomes and the four sequences are assigned randomly.
However, the easy mnemonic feature of the keyworded four
sequences is lost.
The Mexican Cipher device is a Homophonic consisting of
five concentric disks, the outer disk bearing 26 letters and
the other four bearing sequences 01-26, 27-52, 53-78, 79-00.
The cipher disk enhances frequent key changes. Figure 4-12
shows the matrix without the disruption area. [FR5] [NIC4]
HOMOPHONIC CRYPTANALYSIS
Lets solve the following cryptogram.
68321 09022 48057 65111 88648 42036 45235 09144
05764 22684 00225 57003 97357 14074 82524 40768
51058 93074 92188 47264 09328 04255 06186 79882
85144 45886 32574 55136 56019 45722 76844 68350
45219 71649 90528 65106 11886 44044 89669 70553
18491 06985 48579 33684 50957 70612 09795 29148
56109 08546 62062 65509 32800 32568 97216 44282
34031 84989 68564 53789 12530 77401 68494 38544
11368 87616 56905 20710 58864 67472 22490 09136
62851 24551 35180 14230 50886 44084 06231 12876
05579 58980 29503 99713 32720 36433 82689 04516
52263 21175 06445 72255 68951 86957 76095 67215
53049 08567 9730
Assuming we did not know that the above cryptogram was a HOMOPHONIC, we
might make a preliminary analysis to see if we are dealing with
a cipher or a code. We will cover code systems later in the
course, but a few introductory remarks might be in order. The
five letter groups could indicate either a cipher or a code.
If the cryptogram contains an even number of digits, as
for example 494 in the previous message, this leaves open the
possibility that the message is a cipher containing 247 pairs
of digits; were the number of digits an exact odd multiple of
five, such as 125, 135, etc., the possibility that the
cryptogram is in code of the 5-figure group type must be
considered.
We next study the message repetitions and what their
characteristics are. If the cipher text is of 5-figure code
type, then such repetitions as appear should generally be in
whole groups of five digits, and they should be visible in the
text just as the message stands, unless the code message has
been superenciphered. If the cryptogram is a cipher, then
repetitions should extend beyond the 5-digit groupings; if they
conform to any definite at all they should for the most part
contain even numbers of digits since each letter is probably
represented by a pair (dinome) of digits.
We start with 4-part frequency distribution. We next assume a
25 character alphabet from 01-00. This is the common scheme of
drawing up the alphabets. Breaking the text into dinomes
(2-digit) pairs yields:
01
|
02
|
03
|
04
|
05
|
06
|
07
|
08
|
09
|
10
|
11
|
12
|
13
|
14
|
15
|
16
|
17
|
18
|
19
|
20
|
21
|
22
|
23
|
24
|
25
|
///
|
|
///
|
/
|
/////
|
//////
|
///
|
|
////
|
////
|
/////
|
///
|
/
|
/
|
/
|
///
|
|
//////
|
|
/
|
//
|
/////
|
//
|
|
/
|
26
|
27
|
28
|
29
|
30
|
31
|
32
|
33
|
34
|
35
|
36
|
37
|
38
|
39
|
40
|
41
|
42
|
43
|
44
|
45
|
46
|
47
|
48
|
49
|
50
|
///
|
|
/
|
/
|
/
|
|
//////
|
/
|
/
|
/
|
/////
|
/
|
|
/
|
///
|
|
////
|
/
|
//////
|
//////
|
///
|
|
///
|
/////
|
/////
|
51
|
52
|
53
|
54
|
55
|
56
|
57
|
58
|
59
|
60
|
61
|
62
|
63
|
64
|
65
|
66
|
67
|
68
|
69
|
70
|
71
|
72
|
73
|
74
|
75
|
/////
|
/////
|
///
|
|
////
|
/////
|
//////
|
//
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
//////
|
|
/
|
//
|
///////
|
//
|
/
|
/
|
////
|
|
////
|
/
|
76
|
77
|
78
|
79
|
80
|
81
|
82
|
83
|
84
|
85
|
86
|
87
|
88
|
89
|
90
|
91
|
92
|
93
|
94
|
95
|
96
|
97
|
98
|
99
|
00
|
//////
|
/
|
|
/
|
///
|
|
////
|
/
|
//////
|
//////
|
///
|
|
////
|
/////
|
//////
|
///
|
/
|
/
|
/
|
///
|
|
//////
|
/
|
|
//
|
What we have before us are four simple, monoalphabetic
frequency distributions similar to those involved in a
monoalphabetic substitution cipher using standard cipher
alphabets. The next step is to fit the distribution to the
normal. Since I=J for the 25 letter alphabet, we find that the
Keyword is JUNE and the following alphabets result:
01 I-J 26 U 51 N 76 E
02 K 27 V 52 O 77 F
03 L 28 W 53 P 78 G
04 M 29 X 54 Q 79 H
05 N 30 Y 55 R 80 IJ
06 O 31 Z 56 S 81 K
07 P 32 A 57 T 82 L
08 Q 33 B 58 U 83 M
09 R 34 C 59 V 84 N
10 S 35 D 60 W 85 O
11 T 36 E 61 X 86 P
12 U 37 F 62 Y 87 Q
13 V 38 G 63 Z 88 R
14 W 39 H 64 A 89 S
15 X 40 IJ 65 B 90 T
16 Y 41 K 66 C 91 U
17 Z 42 L 67 D 92 V
18 A 43 M 68 E 93 W
19 B 44 N 69 F 94 X
20 C 45 O 70 G 95 Y
21 D 46 P 71 H 96 Z
22 E 47 Q 72 IJ 97 A
23 F 48 R 73 K 98 B
24 G 49 S 74 L 99 C
25 H 50 T 75 M 00 D The first groups of
the cryptogram decipher as follows:
68
|
32
|
10
|
90
|
22
|
48
|
05
|
76
|
51
|
11
|
88
|
64
|
84
|
20
|
36
|
45
|
23
|
e
|
a
|
s
|
t
|
e
|
r
|
n
|
e
|
n
|
t
|
r
|
a
|
n
|
c
|
e
|
o
|
f
|
If a 26-element alphabet were used only the distribution
analysis would have been changed to be on a basis of 26, the
process of fitting the distribution to the normal would be the
same.
PLAIN COMPONENT COMPLETION METHOD
Suppose we know that two correspondents have been using the same
variant system as in the previous Homophonic. The message
intercepted is:
48226 88423 52099 93604 76059 05651 36683 52267
97114 54466 76
A variation of the plain-component completion method can be used to
crack the new message. We copy the message into dinomes and
separate by levels.
48
|
22
|
68
|
84
|
23
|
52
|
09
|
99
|
36
|
04
|
76
|
05
|
90
|
56
|
51
|
36
|
68
|
35
|
22
|
67
|
97
|
11
|
45
|
44
|
66
|
76
|
2
|
1
|
3
|
4
|
1
|
3
|
1
|
4
|
2
|
1
|
4
|
1
|
4
|
3
|
3
|
2
|
3
|
2
|
1
|
3
|
4
|
1
|
2
|
2
|
3
|
4
|
Levels:
(1) 22 23 09 04 05 22 11
(2) 48 36 36 35 45 44
(3) 68 52 56 51 68 67 66
(4) 84 99 76 90 97 76
These dinomes are converted into terms of plain component by setting
each of the cipher sequences against the plain component at an
arbitrary point of coincidence, such as the following:
A
|
B
|
C
|
D
|
E
|
F
|
G
|
H
|
IJ
|
K
|
L
|
M
|
N
|
O
|
P
|
Q
|
R
|
S
|
T
|
U
|
V
|
W
|
X
|
Y
|
Z
|
01
|
02
|
03
|
04
|
05
|
06
|
07
|
08
|
09
|
10
|
11
|
12
|
13
|
14
|
15
|
16
|
17
|
18
|
19
|
20
|
21
|
22
|
23
|
24
|
25
|
26
|
27
|
28
|
29
|
30
|
31
|
32
|
33
|
34
|
35
|
36
|
37
|
38
|
39
|
40
|
41
|
42
|
43
|
44
|
45
|
46
|
47
|
48
|
49
|
50
|
51
|
52
|
53
|
54
|
55
|
56
|
57
|
58
|
59
|
60
|
61
|
62
|
63
|
64
|
65
|
66
|
67
|
68
|
69
|
70
|
71
|
72
|
73
|
74
|
75
|
76
|
77
|
78
|
79
|
80
|
81
|
82
|
83
|
84
|
85
|
86
|
87
|
88
|
89
|
90
|
91
|
92
|
93
|
94
|
95
|
96
|
97
|
98
|
99
|
00
|
So: Levels:
(1) 22=W; 23=X; 09=I; 04=D; 05=E; 22=W; 11=L
(2) 48=X; 36=L; 36=L; 35=K; 45=U; 44=T
(3) 68=S; 52=B; 56=F; 51=A; 68=S; 67=R; 66=Q
(4) 84=I; 99=Y; 76=A; 90=P; 97=W; 76=A
This method works because both the plain component (A,B..) and the
cipher component (01, 02..) are known sequences.
The plain-component sequence is completed on the letters of the
four levels by Caesar Rundown, as follows:
Level
1 |
Level
2 |
Level
3 |
Level
4 |
WXIDEWL |
XLLKUT |
SBFASRQ |
IYAPWA |
XYKEFXM
|
YMMLVU
|
TCGBTSR |
KZBQXB |
YZLFGYN |
ZNNMWV |
UDHCUTS |
LACRYC |
ZAMGHZO |
AOONXW |
VEIDVUT |
MBDSZD |
ABNHIAP |
BPPOYX |
WFKEWVU |
NCETAE |
BCOIKBQ |
CQQPZY |
XGLFXWV |
ODFUBF |
CDPKLCR |
DRRQAZ |
YHMGYXW |
PEGVCG |
DEQLMDS |
ESSRBA |
ZINHZYZ |
QFHWDH |
EFRMNET |
FTTSCB |
AKOIAZY |
RGIXEI |
FGSNOFU |
GUUTDC |
BLPKBAZ
|
SHKYFK |
GHTOPGV |
HVVUED |
CMQLCBA |
TILZGL |
HIUPQHW |
IWWVFE |
DNRMDCB |
UKMAHM |
IKVQRIX |
KXXWGF |
EOSNEDC |
VLNBIN |
KLWRSKY |
LYYXHG |
FPTOFED |
WMOCKO |
LMXSTLZ |
MZZYIH |
GQUPGFE |
XNPDLP |
MNYTUMA |
NAAZKI |
HRVQHGF |
YOQEMQ |
NOZUVNB |
OBBALK |
ISWRIHG |
ZPRFNR |
OPAVWOC |
PCCBML |
KTXSKIH |
AQSGOS |
PQBWXPD |
QDDCNM |
LUYTLKI |
BRTHPT |
QRCXYQE |
REEDON |
MVZUMLK |
CSUIQU |
RSDYZRF |
SFFEPO |
NWAVNML |
DTVKRV |
STEZASG |
TGGFQP |
OXBWONM |
EUWLSW |
TUFABTH |
UHHGRQ |
PYCXPON |
FVXMTX |
UVGBCUI |
VIIHSR |
QZDYQPO |
GWYNUY |
VWHCDVK |
WKKITS |
RAEZRQP |
HXZOVZ |
The generatrices with the best assortment of high frequency
letters for the four levels are:
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
EFRMNET REEDON EOSNEDC NCETAE
Arranging the letters of these generatrices in order of appearance of
their dinome equivalents, according to levels we have:
48 |
22 |
68 |
84 |
23 |
52 |
09 |
99 |
36 |
04 |
76 |
05 |
90 |
56 |
51 |
36 |
68 |
35 |
22 |
67 |
97 |
|
E |
|
|
F |
|
R |
|
|
M |
|
N |
|
|
|
|
|
|
E |
|
|
R |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
E |
|
|
|
|
|
|
E |
|
D |
|
|
|
|
|
E |
|
|
O |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
S |
N |
|
E |
|
|
D |
|
|
|
|
N |
|
|
|
C |
|
|
E |
|
T |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A |
The plain text reads "Reinforcements needed a[t
once]". Looking at the equivalents 01,26, 51, 76 we
reveal the keyword JUNE.
In evaluating generatrices, the sum of the arithmetic
frequencies of the letters in each row may be used as an
indication of the relative "goodness". A statistically
better procedure uses the logarithm of the probabilities of the
plain text letters forming the generatrices. See [FR2]
The Homophonic is a popular cipher and has been discussed
in several issues of The Cryptogram as well as LEDGES' NOVICE
NOTES. See references [HOM1 -HOM6] and [LEDG].
For our computer bugs, TATTERS Homophonic solver is very easy to
use and available on the Crypto Drop Box.
MORE COMPLICATED TYPES OF CIPHER
ALPHABETS WITH VARIANTS
GRANDPRE
Consider the cipher matrices shown in figures 4-11 to
4-13. These are called frequential matrices, since the number of
cipher values available for any given plain text letter closely
approximates its relative plain text frequency.
Figure 4-11
|
|
|
A |
B |
C |
D |
E |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
V |
W |
X |
Y |
Z |
A |
* |
* |
T |
G |
A |
U |
R |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
I |
E |
C |
A |
P |
B |
* |
* |
S |
L |
I |
E |
Y |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
F |
R |
N |
S |
T |
C |
* |
* |
C |
N |
D |
O |
M |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
E |
L |
T |
I |
H |
D |
* |
* |
R |
A |
P |
T |
F |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
O |
Y |
S |
O |
V |
E |
* |
* |
N |
T |
X |
N |
E |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
C |
E |
R |
E |
D |
|
|
|
V |
* |
* |
N |
O |
A |
T |
E |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A |
L |
E |
Z |
H |
W |
* |
* |
I |
H |
R |
O |
Q |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
E |
T |
R |
T |
B |
X |
* |
* |
O |
I |
E |
T |
A |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
C |
N |
P |
E |
S |
Y |
* |
* |
F |
T |
L |
O |
S |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A |
M |
T |
I |
U |
Z |
* |
* |
I |
S |
N |
D |
R |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
I |
E |
D |
O |
N |
( 676 - cell matrix )
In figure 4-11, the number of occurrences of a particular
letter within the matrix is proportional to the frequency in
plain text; the letters are inscribed in random manner, in order
to enhance the security of the system.
Figure 4-12
|
|
|
6 |
8 |
9 |
1 |
5 |
4 |
3 |
7 |
2 |
0 |
7 |
* |
* |
A |
A |
A |
C |
D |
E |
E |
I |
L |
N |
1 |
* |
* |
A |
A |
C |
D |
E |
E |
H |
K |
N |
O |
3 |
* |
* |
A |
B |
D |
E |
E |
H |
J |
N |
O |
R |
8 |
* |
* |
A |
D |
E |
E |
H |
I |
N |
O |
R |
S |
9 |
* |
* |
C |
E |
E |
G |
I |
N |
O |
R |
S |
T |
2 |
* |
* |
E |
E |
F |
I |
M |
O |
Q |
S |
T |
T |
0 |
* |
* |
E |
F |
I |
M |
O |
P |
R |
T |
T |
U |
5 |
* |
* |
F |
I |
L |
N |
P |
R |
S |
T |
U |
X |
6 |
* |
* |
I |
L |
N |
P |
R |
S |
T |
U |
W |
Y |
4 |
* |
* |
L |
N |
O |
R |
S |
T |
T |
V |
Y |
Z |
In figure 4-12, the same idea as 4-11 is presented in
reduced form from 26 x 26 to 10 x 10. The letters have been
inscribed by a simple diagonal route, from left to right, within
the square, and the coordinates scrambled by means of a key word
or key number.
Figure 4-13 "Grandpre"
|
|
|
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
0 |
* |
* |
E |
N |
T |
R |
U |
C |
K |
I |
N |
G |
1 |
* |
* |
Q |
U |
A |
R |
A |
N |
T |
E |
E |
N |
2 |
* |
* |
U |
N |
E |
X |
P |
E |
C |
T |
E |
D |
3 |
* |
* |
I |
M |
P |
O |
S |
S |
I |
B |
L |
E |
4 |
* |
* |
V |
I |
C |
T |
O |
R |
I |
O |
U |
S |
5 |
* |
* |
A |
D |
J |
U |
D |
I |
C |
A |
T |
E |
6 |
* |
* |
L |
A |
B |
O |
R |
A |
T |
O |
R |
Y |
7 |
* |
* |
E |
I |
G |
H |
T |
E |
E |
N |
T |
H |
8 |
* |
* |
N |
A |
T |
U |
R |
A |
L |
I |
Z |
E |
9 |
* |
* |
T |
W |
E |
N |
T |
Y |
F |
I |
V |
E |
Figure 4-13 illustrates the famous Grandpre Cipher; in
this square ten words are inscribed containing all the letters
of the alphabet and linked by a column keyword
("equivalent") as a mnemonic for inscription of the
row words. ACA literature also covers this cipher. See
references [LEDG] and [GRA1 - 3] for solution hints for the
Grandpre cipher.
SACCO
General Luigi Sacco proposed a frequential-type system
that uses both enciphering and deciphering matrices. The
inscribed dinomes were completely disarranged by applying a
double transposition to suppress the relationships between
letters. References [SACC] and [FR1] both give a good
description of the process. The number of variant values in this
system are reflective of the Italian language.
BACONIAN
The Baconian ciphers found in the Cryptogram are a variant
system. The "a" elements may be represented by any one
of 20 consonants as variants, while the "b" elements
may be represented by any one of 6 vowels; or the letters A-M
may be used to represent the "a" elements and the
letters N-Z for the "b" elements; digits may be used
for either the "a" or "b" elements, either
on the basis of first five or last five digits, or odd versus
even digits, or the first 10 consonants (B-M) and the last 10
consonants (N-Z)
SUMMING-TRINOME
Friedman describes a complex variant known as the summing-
trinome system. Each plain text letter is assigned a value from
1-26; this value is expressed as a trinome, the digits of which
sum to the designated value of the letter. The letter assigned
the value of 4 may be represented by any of 15 permutations and
combinations. Friedman discusses further ways of complication
including disarrangement, addition of punctuation and nulls. See
[FR1] pages 109-110. Note the inverted normal distribution
representation of this cipher.
ANALYSIS OF A SIMPLE VARIANT
EXAMPLE
The following cryptogram is available for study:
Q M D
C V |
P L F
N F |
D H N
W J |
W L K
D K |
N H B
P V |
R L T
V M |
B K L
W D |
W V H
V K |
S H B
C L |
P Q K
J R |
V W S
M L |
K G C
N R |
L R N
K V |
M G F
X W |
J R G
M V |
W G T
J H |
Q K X
F N |
Z V F
D M |
L T B
P L |
P V F
L M |
D C N
W N |
H B C
V Z |
N M L
W Q |
F D H
D W |
V Z B
R V |
K L C
V C |
V R D
H L |
R V T
L F |
N C D
K G |
M X W
X M |
D T S
C B |
C L Z
L R |
L M V
T S |
Z N K
B W |
V P B
R N |
C L R
X R |
D C N
K V |
P B T
N T |
G H J
Z L |
F Q F
V K |
B W D
Z X |
P N H
S P |
G H L
K L |
F V Z
L T |
V M L
K D |
P Q R
N Z |
L Z D
T B |
M N T
G M |
N Z V
F X |
K S F
D C |
L Z V
T V |
F D F
V R |
G C L
P Q |
P N C
D W |
V R J
T N |
H L Z
L M |
V W N
P V |
P D Z
D W |
J P N
W L |
R J K
V M |
X M D
T S |
M G F
D R |
D K L
W J |
F L P
J M |
S F Q
W B |
F N C
B Z |
D K V
W G |
Z S H
B H |
D H J
C X |
Note the total absence of A, E, I, O, U, and Y. Remarkable
and definitely nonrandom event. Since a uniliteral substitution
alphabet with 6 letters missing is highly unlikely, the next
guess is we are dealing with a multiliteral substitution. Closer
inspection shows that ten consonants are initials (B D G J L N Q
S V X) and the remaining ten consonants are used as terminals (C
F H K M P R T W Z). This implies both bipartite and biliteral
character.
We construct a digraphic distribution:
|
|
C |
F |
H |
K |
M |
P |
R |
T |
W |
Z |
B |
* |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
D |
* |
4 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
2 |
G |
* |
2 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
J |
* |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
L |
* |
1 |
4 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
N |
* |
4 |
1 |
4 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
Q |
* |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
S |
* |
1 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
V |
* |
1 |
4 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
3 |
4 |
3 |
X |
* |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
We assume the use of a small enciphering matrix with
variants for rows and columns. We assume that the various
possible cipher variants are of approximately equal frequency;
the column indicators pair equally often with the row indicators
of the enciphering matrix. We look for similar row profiles and
column profiles. We match first the rows and then the columns.
Row L and V distributions have pronounced similarities.
They are "heavy" in their frequency distributions in
the same places. So are rows D and N. They have homologous
attributes in appearance.
|
|
C |
F |
H |
K |
M |
P |
R |
T |
W |
Z |
L |
* |
1 |
4 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
V |
* |
1 |
4 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
3 |
4 |
3 |
|
D |
* |
4 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
2 |
N |
* |
4 |
1 |
4 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
Finding the next rows are not obvious. We use a
"goodness of match" procedure to equate
interchangeable variants. We calculate the cross-product sums
for each trial. The next heavy row is G. We test G against the
remaining rows.
G |
* |
2 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
B |
* |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
G*B |
* |
6 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
=15 |
We compare the balance of rows:
G*B |
+ |
6 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
=15 |
G*J |
+ |
2 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
=11 |
G*Q |
+ |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
=7 |
G*S |
+ |
2 |
4 |
4 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
=17 |
G*X |
+ |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
=8 |
The results are most probably match G and S.
The next heaviest row is B. Testing against the remaining three
rows we have:
B*J |
+ |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
=17 |
B*Q |
+ |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
=12 |
B*X |
+ |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
=12 |
The correct pairings are B with J and Q with X. Since we
have not found more than two rows for any one set of
interchangeable values the original matrix has only five rows.
|
|
C |
F |
H |
K |
M |
P |
R |
T |
W |
Z |
B |
J |
4 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
2 |
3 |
2 |
D |
N |
8 |
2 |
8 |
7 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
7 |
5 |
G |
S |
3 |
4 |
4 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
2 |
L |
V |
2 |
8 |
1 |
7 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
6 |
7 |
7 |
Q |
X |
0 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
Values represent the sums of the combined rows. We apply
the same process to matching columns. C and H are a matched
pair. F with M and P with R. We use the cross product sums for
the balance of the columns.
K*T+ |
4 |
35 |
42 |
- |
81 |
K*W+ |
4 |
49 |
49 |
9 |
111 |
K*Z+ |
4 |
35 |
49 |
- |
88 |
T*W+ |
6 |
35 |
42 |
- |
83 |
T*Z+ |
4 |
25 |
2 |
42 |
73 |
W*Z+ |
6 |
35 |
49 |
- |
90 |
Combinations:
KT,
WZ+ |
81 |
+ |
90 |
= |
171 |
KW,
TZ+ |
111 |
+ |
73 |
= |
186 |
KT,
TW+ |
88 |
+ |
83 |
= |
171 |
We would expect that the proper pairings are K with W and
T with Z.
|
|
C |
F |
K |
P |
T |
|
|
|
H |
M |
W |
R |
Z |
|
B |
J |
6 |
4 |
5 |
7 |
4 |
PHI(p)= |
1962 |
D |
N |
16 |
4 |
14 |
4 |
10 |
PHI(r)= |
1132 |
G |
S |
7 |
9 |
- |
1 |
3 |
PHI(o)= |
1670 |
L |
V |
3 |
15 |
14 |
17 |
13 |
|
Q |
X |
- |
6 |
6 |
- |
4 |
|
We convert the multiliteral text to uniliteral equivalents
using an arbitrary square for reduction to plain text.
|
|
C |
F |
K |
P |
T |
|
|
H |
M |
W |
R |
Z |
B |
J |
A |
B |
C |
D |
E |
D |
N |
F |
G |
H |
IJ |
K |
G |
S |
L |
M |
N |
O |
P |
L |
V |
Q |
R |
S |
T |
U |
Q |
X |
V |
W |
X |
Y |
Z |
The converted cryptogram is solved via the principals in Lecture 2 and Lecture 3. The
beginning of the message reads Weather forecast. The original
keying matrix is recovered with a keyword of ATMOSPHERIC.
|
|
C |
F |
K |
P |
T |
|
|
H |
M |
W |
R |
Z |
B |
J |
A |
T |
M |
O |
S |
D |
N |
P |
H |
E |
R |
I |
G |
S |
C |
B |
D |
F |
G |
L |
V |
K |
L |
N |
Q |
U |
Q |
X |
V |
W |
X |
Y |
Z |
The method of matching rows and columns applies equally
well for all the matrices shown previously. It is key to start
with the best rows and columns from not only heaviness
standpoint but the distinctive crests and troughs. A second key
is the low frequency letters. No variant system can adequately
disguise low frequency letters and they will have the same
frequency in the cipher text. Friedman describes a more general
solution to variant analysis. [FRE1, p119 ff]
Chapter 10 of reference [FRE1] covers the disruption
process associated with monome-dinome alphabets of
Irregular-Length cipher text units. Figures 4-14 and Figure 4-15
show enciphering matrices where the encipherment is disrupted
and commutative. The normal row conventions are used to encipher
except when the row indicator was the same for the immediately
preceding letter. In Figure 4-14, EIGHT could be encrypted 10 29
7 8 49 and then rearranged into standard groups of 5 letters
(numbers). In Figure 4-15, E = 24 or 42, T = 621 or 162. Figure
4-16 is an example of the Russian disruption process added for
security.
ISOLOGS
Cryptograms produced using identical plain text but
subjected to different cryptographic treatment, and yielding
different cipher texts are called isologs. (isos = equal and
logos = word in Greek). Isologs are usually equal or nearly
equal in length. Isologs, no matter how the cryptographic
treatment varies, are among the most powerful tools available to
the cryptanalyst to solve difficult cryptosystems.
Take two messages A and B suspected of being isologs and
write them out under each other. We then examine the
similarities and differences. Assume the messages both start
with "Reference your message..." I will arrange the
messages in a special table to facilitate the study.
Group No.
5 10 15
A 82 26 56 31 03 74 83 96 98 42 32 52 97 01 15
A' 30 15 08 74 97 14 51 19 73 60 49 67 65 01 06
B 80 27 78 91 06 94 00 01 38 28 54 08 24 00 65
B' 45 64 79 91 81 69 67 25 38 89 41 56 32 52 03
C 63 62 93 39 18 43 15 88 10 48 26 45 84 50 39
C' 90 62 87 75 36 20 35 11 05 70 89 27 77 50 11
D 81 71 35 25 38 73 30 92 07 49 61 75 21 64 76
D' 35 19 99 01 38 99 97 45 02 32 04 11 58 92 16
E 38 72 89 11 47 99 92 64 14 68 13 36 53 38 81
E' 38 46 31 75 47 14 64 80 06 46 85 86 45 38 98
F 89 69 79 38 16 51 75 05 70 74 11 80 44 32 55
F' 26 12 18 38 78 94 88 93 37 28 11 27 22 05 04
G 28 12 02 77 30 31 19 97 99 62 27 86 56 06 53
G' 06 48 43 21 03 98 71 54 26 62 80 76 08 98 80
H 90 87 04 08 67 46 59 41 98 55 10 82 22 29 87
H' 44 10 55 29 00 59 72 82 28 55 87 30 07 08 93
J 46 72 93 62 45
J' 59 68 24 62 53
The dinome distributions for these two messages are as follows:
Message A |
Message B |
|
|
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
0 |
|
|
|
|
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
* |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
- |
1 |
1 |
2 |
|
|
1 |
* |
4 |
1 |
- |
2 |
1 |
1 |
- |
1 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
* |
1 |
1 |
- |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
- |
|
|
2 |
* |
1 |
1 |
- |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
* |
2 |
2 |
- |
- |
1 |
1 |
- |
5 |
2 |
2 |
|
|
3 |
* |
1 |
2 |
- |
- |
2 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
- |
2 |
4 |
* |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
- |
|
|
4 |
* |
1 |
- |
1 |
1 |
3 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
- |
5 |
* |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
- |
- |
1 |
1 |
|
|
5 |
* |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
- |
1 |
2 |
1 |
6 |
* |
1 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
- |
1 |
1 |
1 |
- |
|
|
6 |
* |
- |
3 |
- |
2 |
1 |
- |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
* |
1 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
|
|
7 |
* |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
* |
2 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
- |
1 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
|
|
8 |
* |
1 |
1 |
- |
- |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
* |
1 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
- |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
|
|
9 |
* |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
- |
- |
2 |
3 |
2 |
1 |
0 |
* |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
- |
2 |
|
|
0 |
* |
2 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
- |
1 |
Both distributions are too flat - no crests or troughs. We
assume a variant system of a monoalphabetic cryptosystem. [FRE3]
shows us how to use a Poisson exponential distribution to
evaluate random text. The gist of the statistics is that the
expected number of blanks is too low. The chi test indicates
extreme non randomness for both messages. The chi test applied
to both distributions implies that they both have been
enciphered by the same cryptosystem because there exists a close
correlation between the patterns of the two distributions. [FR1,
p123} discusses the potentialities of the cryptomathematics as a
supporting science to cryptography.
There are several identical values between the messages.
This implies that not only has the same cryptosystem been used
but also the same enciphering matrix. The values 38 and 62 must
represent very low frequency letters because no variants are
even provided for this letter.
We now form isolog chains between the messages.
(06 14 15 26 28 31 35 73 74 81 89 98 99)
(02 07 20 22 43 44 63 90)
(12 37 48 51 69 70 83 94)
(03 30 41 54 65 82 97)
(05 10 24 32 49 87 93)
(16 18 36 76 78 79 86)
(27 45 53 64 80 92)
(11 39 75 88)
(21 58 77 84)
(46 59 68 72)
(00 52 67)
(04 55 61)
(08 29 56)
(19 71 96)
(01 25)
(13 85) Single Dinomes:
(42 60) (38) (47) (50) (62) (91)
These chains of cipher values represent identical plain text
pairs. Beginning with the first value in the message 82 and 30 a
partial chain of equivalent variants is formed; now locating the
other occurrences of either value we note the value that
coincides with it in the other message. We therefore extend the
chain. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 0 ................... 1 . D N H E E A - A C O 2 . I T - O M E S
E F T 3 . E O - - E A N B D R 4 . R Y T T S L V N O - 5 . N U S R
P F - I L X 6 . P W T S R - U L N Y 7 . C L E E D A I A A N 8 . E
R N I H A O D E S 9 . G S O N - C R E E T 0 . M T R P O E T F - U
Manipulating the rows and columns with a view
to uncovering the keys or symmetry, we find a latent diagonal
pattern without keyword. We set up the following enciphering
matrix:
6 8 9 1 5 4 3 7 2 0
...................
7 . A A A C D E E I L N
1 . A A C D E E H K N O
3 . A B D E E H J N O R
8 . A D E E H I N O R S
9 . C E E G I N O R S T
2 . E E F I M O Q S T T
0 . E F I M O P R T T U
5 . F I L N P R S T U X
6 . I L N P R S T U W Y
4 . L N O R S T T V Y Z
I can not over emphasize the value of isologs. The value goes far
beyond simple variant systems. Isologs produced by two different
code books or two different enciphered code versions of the same
plain text; or two encryptions of identical plain text at
different settings of a cipher machine, may all prove of
inestimable value in the attack on a difficult system.
SYNOPTIC CHART OF CRYPTOGRAPHY
PRESENTED IN LECTURES 1 - 5
Cryptograms
.
.
------------------------------------------
Cipher Code Enciphered Code
.
.
--------------------------------------------
Substitution Transposition Combined
. Substitution -
. Transposition
.
.-------------------------------------------
Monoalphabetic Multiple- Polyalphabetic
. Alphabetic
. Systems
.
.
Uniliteral ......................... Multiliteral
. .
. .
. .
Standard ... Mixed .
Alphabets Alphabets .
. .
. .
Keyword ... Random .
Mixed Mixed .
.
.
.
...............................
. .
Single Equivalent Variant ........
. .
. .
.................... .
. . .
Fixed Length Mixed Length .
Cipher Groups Cipher Groups .
. . .
. ....................... .
Biliteral...N-literal . . .
Monome-Dinome Others .
.
.
.
...................................
.
.
..........................
. .
Matrices with Non Bipartite
Coordinates
(Bipartite)
Here is the tentative plan for the balance of the course. Just a
plan - subject to revision.
LECTURES 5 - 7
We will cover recognition and solution of XENOCRYPTS
(language substitution ciphers) in detail.
LECTURES 8 - 12
We will investigate and crack Polyalphabetic Substitution
systems.
LECTURES 13 - 18
We will investigate and crack Cipher Exchange and
Transpositions problems.
LECTURE 19
We will devote this lecture to International Law.
LECTURES 20 - 23
We will walk through the mathematical fields to solve
Cryptarithms.
LECTURES 24 - 25
We will introduce modern cryptographic systems and field
special topics. We will do a primer on PGP.
SOLUTIONS TO HOMEWORK PROBLEMS FROM LECTURE 3
Thanks to JOE-O for his concise sols.
Mv-1. From Martin Gardner.
8 5 1 8 5 1 9 1 1 9 9 1 3
1 6 1 2 5 1 1 2 1 6 8 1 2 5
2 0 9 3 3 1 5 4 5 2 0 8 1
2 0 9 2 2 5 1 4 5 2 2 5
1 8 1 9 5 5 1 4 2 5 6 1 5
1 8 5 1 3 1 2 5 2 5 2 5 1 5
2 1 3 1 1 4 2 1 1 9 5 9 2 0
9 1 4 2 5 1 5 2 1 1 8 3 1 5
1 2 2 1 1 3 1 4
1 3 1 1 8 2 0 9 1 4 7 1 1 8 4 1 4 5 1 8
8 5 1 4 4 5 1 8 1 9 1 5 1 4 2 2 9 1 2 1 2 5
1 4 1 5 1 8 2 0 8 3 1 1 8 1 5 1 2 9 1 4 1
I presented Mv-1 in a strange format. It fooled some but not all. The
Key is 01=1=a, 02=2=b,...26=z. the alphabet is standard. Message
reads: " Here's a simple alphabetic code that I've never
seen before. Maybe you can use it in you column. Martin Gardner,
Hendersonville, North Carolina.
Solve and reconstruct the cryptographic systems used.
Mv-2.
0 6 0 2 1 0 0 5 0 1 0 1 0 5 1 5 2 2 0 2 0 6 0 8 2
3 2 5 1 0 0 8 0 4 0 2 2 1 0 9 0 8 0 4 0 8 2 2 1 1
0 8 0 4 1 7 1 5 1 3 1 4 2 2 2 1 0 2 2 4 0 2 0 1 2
2 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 8 1 9 0 6 1 5 1 7 0 8 0 1 1 1 2 2
1 4 0 2 0 1 1 9 0 6 0 5 1 0 0 2 0 2 1 1 2 2 1 4 0
6 2 3 1 9 0 5 1 5 0 1 2 2 1 3 0 2 0 5 0 6 1 3 0 2
0 5 0 1 1 0 0 5 2 3 0 6 2 1 0 2 2 2 1 4 0 6 0 2 0
2 2 2 1 4 0 6 0 2 0 2 2 6 0 2 0 6 0 5 2 1 1 9 0 2
0 2 1 1 2 2 0 3 0 2 1 7 2 4 0 2 1 9 0 2 0 6 1 5 0
5 1 1 0 6 0 2 1 9 0 5 0 6 2 2 0 1 0 5 0 5 0 1 1 9
0 5 2 1 1 5 2 2 1 5 0 5 0 1 2 2 0 5 1 8 0 5 0 6 0
6 0 5 0 3
Divide the original cipher into pairs, noting that each pair started
with 0,1, or 2 and ended with 0 - 9. Construct a matrix similar
to Figure 3-2. (3 x 10) Fill in the matrix with A=01, ending with
Z=26. Used 00 =blank. Reduce by converting dinomes to letters.
Apply the Phi test and found mon- alphabetic. Used frequency, VOC
count, and consonant line to identify B, H, E as vowels and
N,D,X,C,I,Y,R,J, as possible consonants. Marking the message with
these assumptions, found last eight characters to be a pattern
word in Cryptodict as TOMORROW. Working between cipher text and
key alphabet matrix, rest fell.
Message reads:Reconnoiter Auys Cayes Bay at daylight
seventeen April and then proceed through point George on course
three three zero speed twelve period report noon position
tomorrow.
Key = NEW YORK, 3 X 10 matrix, Rows 0,1,2, columns 0-9 and
00 blank.
Mv-3.
5 3 2 4 1 5 4 5 3 2 2 4 4 3 2 5 1 2 4 3 2 4 2 3 1
5 4 4 4 5 4 5 3 2 5 1 4 3 4 4 1 4 1 5 2 1 4 1 1 5
4 3 4 5 3 5 2 1 2 3 3 5 1 2 5 1 1 4 2 1 5 3 3 3 4
5 3 2 4 4 2 3 1 5 4 5 4 5 2 4 4 3 2 4 1 4 4 4 3 2
1 2 5 3 2 4 4 3 4 4 2 4 1 5 4 4 4 5 2 4 4 3 3 5 2
1 5 3 3 3 1 3 1 4 4 4 1 5 4 5 4 4 5 1 4 3 2 5 1 5
2 3 2 4 1 5 5 2 2 4 4 3 1 5 3 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 4 5 5
3 2 4 1 3 4 5 2 1 2 5 3 3 5 2 2 4 3 4 1 3 1 2 4 5
4 4 5 2 3 3 4 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 5 3 3 4 5 2 1 3 5 2
4 4 4 4 4 4 5 3 2 1 5 1 3 1 5 5 2 2 4 4 3 1 5 3 1
2 4 5 1 1 3 1 4 2 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 1 5 2 2 3 5 2 4 2
5 3 5 2 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 2 3 1 2 1 3 1 4 3 3 4 5 3 3
1 2 1 3 4 4 4 1 2 4 4 3 3 3 1 2 1 4 3 2 2 4 3 3 3
1 3 2 4 5 1 2 2 5 3 5 1 2 5 3 2 3 3 5 1 2 5 1 1 4
4 4 1 5 4 5 4 1 4 3 2 4 4 4 2 4 1 3 4 5 1 5 2 2 1
2 5 1 4 5 1 2 1 3 2 4 4 5 3 2 1 2 5 1 4 4 1 5 1 3
1 4 2 5 2 4 2 4 4 5
Noted all entries were numbered 1-5. Assumed a 5 x 5 matrix filled with
a straight alphabet, substituted letters for the dinomes. Used
frequency count, contact count and phi test to confirm
mono-alphabeticity. Identified 8 consonants and 2 vowels. Made
the E, T assumption based on frequency. First word dropped as
weather. Rest of message fell apart with addition of W, A, R to
the matrix.
Message reads: Weather forecast Thursday partly cloudy ...
at present about one thousand feet.
Key = Beginning column 1 = MONDAY, in 5 x 5 matrix.
My last two problems were taken from reference [OP20]
course.
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